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Abstract
In this paper we analyze an endogenous growth model with human capital that
results from public educational spending. We allow for public debt and analyze
three different debt policies: a balanced government budget, a slight deficit policy
where debt grows but less than GDP, and a strong deficit policy where debt grows at
the same rate as GDP. We find that the balanced budget policy and the policy with
a slightly growing public debt are equivalent as concerns long-run economic growth.
Further, those two rules yield higher growth than a debt policy where public debt
grows at the same rate as GDP, unless the government is a creditor. As concerns
welfare, it can be demonstrated that a strong deficit policy yields lower welfare
than a balanced budget and a slight deficit, unless initial debt ratios are low and
the intertemporal elasticity of substituion is high. Finally, it is demonstrated that
there may exist an inverted U-shaped relation between welfare and deficit financed
educational spending.
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1 Introduction
The question of how public debt and deficits affect economic growth and welfare of coun-
tries is not only of academic interest but has also practical relevance. The current debt
crisis in the Euro area that has still not yet been completely overcome demonstrates this
very clearly. The goal of the current paper, therefore, is to contribute to the research an-
alyzing the relation between different public debt policies, economic growth and welfare.
To do so, we resort to a well established endogenous growth model with human capital
formation that is the source of ongoing economic growth.
The seminal papers in the field of endogenous growth with human capital are the
contributions by Uzawa (1965) and by Lucas (1988) that are basically the same. There,
the representative individual decides how much of his available time is spent for producing
physical output and how much is used for the formation of human capital. Human capital
is modeled as a production factor that raises aggregate production possibilities as well as
the marginal product of physical capital and, thus, affects the incentive to invest and the
long-run growth rate.
However, the latter model does not consider public spending in the process of human
capital formation. Contributions that take into account that the public sector can stimu-
late the formation of human capital by devoting public resources to schooling, are Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992), Ni and Wang (1994), Beauchemin (2001), Blankenau and Simpson
(2004) and Greiner (2008), for example. In those contributions, human capital accumu-
lation results either from both private and public services, as in Glomm and Ravikumar
and in Blankenau, or from public spending alone, as in Ni and Wang, in Beauchemin and
in Greiner.
In this paper, we take as a starting point the model presented in Greiner (2008).
In that model, the question of how fiscal policy affects human capital formation and
economic growth has been studied, assuming that the economy is on a balanced growth
path where all variables, including public debt, grow at the same rate. Further, the
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influence of fiscal policy on the stability of the model economy has been analyzed there.
However, comparative public debt policies have not been considered. This is the goal of
this contribution, where we intend to complement the analysis by studying the effects
of different debt and deficit policies on economic growth and welfare. Thus, we analyze
the implications of a balanced government budget and compare them to those of a public
deficit policy where debt grows in the long-run but less than GDP, which we refer to as a
slight deficit policy, and to those of a fiscal policy where debt grows at the same rate as
GDP and all other endogenous variables, which is called a strong deficit policy.
Thus, we follow the research strategy proposed in Greiner (2011) where an endogenous
growth model with positive spillovers of capital has been analyzed in which public goods
affect welfare in the economy but that are not productive. There, it has been shown that
a balanced budget policy and a policy with a slight deficit yield higher long-run growth
and also higher welfare than a policy where debt grows at the same rate as GDP. The
reason for that outcome is that a higher debt to GDP ratio implies that a larger part of
aggregate savings is used for unproductive spending instead of capital formation. This
reduces the shadow price of private wealth and leads to a lower supply of labor and,
consequently, the incentive to save and invest so that the balanced growth rate takes on
a lower value. It is in this way that public debt affects the allocation of resources in that
model. The comparative welfare effects of the first two policies, however, depend on the
weight attached to public goods in the utility function and there exists a critical value for
the parameter that determines that weight such that one of the two policies is beneficial
as regards welfare.
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the growth model
with human capital and defines equilibrium conditions and the notion of a balanced growth
path. Section 3 analyzes the implications of the different budgetary policies, where we
first study growth effects and, then, welfare effects. Section 4, finally, concludes the paper
and the appendix contains the proofs of the propositions.
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2 The model with human capital formation
The basic structure of our growth model is identical to that in Greiner (2008). We consider
a decentralized economy that consists of a household sector that receives labor income
and income from its saving, a productive sector and the government. First, we describe
the private sector.
2.1 The private sector
Overall population in the economy is assumed to be constant and the household sector is
represented by one household that maximizes the discounted stream of utility resulting
from consumption, C, over an infinite time horizon subject to its budget constraint.1 The
utility function is assumed to be given by U(C) = (C1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ) and labor, L, is
supplied inelastically. The maximization problem, then, can be written as
max
C
∫
∞
0
e−ρt (C1−σ − 1)/(1− σ)dt, (1)
subject to
(1− τ) (wuL+ rW ) = W˙ + C. (2)
We denote by ρ the subjective discount rate, 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution of consumption, w is the wage rate and r is the interest rate. Assets are denoted
by W ≡ B+K which are equal to public debt, B, and physical capital, K, and τ ∈ (0, 1)
is the income tax rate. The dot gives the derivative with respect to time and we neglect
depreciation of physical capital.
Further, u gives that part of available time used of production and 1− u is that part
of time used for education, which builds up a human capital stock. We assume that the
part of time used for human capital formation is determined by the government through
mandatory attendance laws so that the household takes u as exogenously given.
1We omit the time argument t if no ambiguity arises.
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The productive sector is represented by one firm which behaves competitively and
which maximizes static profits. The production function of the firm is given by
Y = K1−α(uhcL)
α, (3)
with 0 < α < 1. The parameter (1−α) denotes the physical capital share and α gives the
labor share. Human per-capita capital is denoted by hc, which is labor augmenting, and
u is that part of the labor force employed in the final goods sector. Profit maximization
yields
w = α(uL)−1Y (4)
r = (1− α)K−1Y . (5)
Solving the intertemporal optimization problem of the household and using (4), (5),
which must hold in equilibrium, the growth rate of consumption can be derived as
C˙
C
= −
ρ
σ
+
(1− τ)(1− α)K−α(uhcL)
α
σ
. (6)
2.2 Human capital formation
Human capital in our economy is produced in the schooling sector where we assume
that the government decides about the time the household has to spend for education.
Additionally, the government uses public resources for education in the schooling sector,
like expenditures for books and other teaching material, which is an input in the process
of human capital formation, too. Thus, the input in the schooling sector is composed of
time spent for education by the household and of school expenditures by the government.
We assume decreasing returns to scale in each input alone and constant returns to scale
in both inputs together.
As concerns the production function for human capital formation we assume a Cobb-
Douglas specification. Setting labor equal to one, L = 1, which holds from now on, the
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differential equation describing the change in human per-capita capital can be written as
h˙c = ξ((1− u)hc)
βhI1−βhe , (7)
with Ie public resources used in the schooling sector, ξ > 0 a technology parameter and
βh ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of human capital formation with respect to the time spent for
education.
2.3 The government
The government in our economy receives tax revenues from income taxation and has
revenues from issuing government bonds it then uses for public spending in the schooling
sector and for interest payments on public debt. Thus, the period budget constraint of
the government is given by
B˙ = r(1− τ)B + Ie − τwu− τrK. (8)
In addition, the intertemporal budget constraint must hold stating that the present value
of public debt asymptotically converges to zero, i.e. limt→∞ e
−r(1−τ)tB(t) = 0.
Further, we posit that the government sets the primary surplus to GDP ratio such
that it is a positive linear function of the debt to GDP ratio. The primary surplus ratio,
then, can be written as
S
Y
= φ+ ψ
B
Y
, (9)
where φ ∈ IR and ψ ∈ IR++. The motivation for that rule, in particular for ψ > 0, is that
it makes the debt to GDP ratio a mean-reverting process so that it prevents the debt to
GDP ratio from exploding, which is necessary for the intertemporal budget constraint of
the government to be fulfilled.2 The parameter ψ determines how strong the government
reacts to variations in the public debt to GDP ratio so that we refer to this parameter as
the reaction coefficient.
2For more details which debt policies guarantee sustainability see Greiner and Fincke (2015).
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Using (9), the differential equation describing the evolution of public debt, equation
(8), can be rewritten as
B˙ = (r(1− τ)− ψ)B − φY. (10)
Given equation (10), it is immediately seen that the different debt policies can be
modelled by appropriate choices of the two fiscal parameters φ and ψ. Setting φ = 0,
ψ = r(1 − τ) yields a balanced government budget, B˙ = 0. Choosing φ = 0 and ψ such
that ρ/σ + r(1− τ)(σ − 1)/σ < ψ < r(1− τ) holds, public debt grows but less than the
balanced growth rate.
It should be pointed out that equation (9) implies that variations in the debt to
physical capital ratio go along with changes in public educational spending, for a fixed
income tax rate τ . That holds because variations in public debt lead to changes in the
primary surplus relative to GDP that generate changes in public expenditures. Hence, a
higher debt to physical capital ratio implies less public educational spending that may be
referred to as a sort of internal crowding out. Before we analyze the implications of the
different debt policies in detail we define equilibrium conditions and the balanced growth
path.
2.4 Equilibrium conditions and the balanced growth path
First, we define an equilibrium for our model in definition 1.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of variables {C(t), K(t), hc(t), B(t)}
∞
t=0 and a
sequence of prices {w(t), r(t)}∞t=0 such that, given prices and fiscal rules, the household
solves (1) subject to (2), the firm maximizes profits, and the budget constraint of the
government (8) is fulfilled and the government sticks to the rule defined in (9).
Thus, using (8) and (10) we get the amount of public resources used in the schooling
sector, Ie, in equilibrium. Inserting the resulting value in (7), the growth rate of human
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capital is described by the following differential equation,
h˙c
hc
= ξ
((1− u)hc)
βh
hc
((
uhc
K
)α
K(τ − φ)− ψB
)1−βh
. (11)
The economy-wide resource constraint is obtained by combining equations (2) and
(10) as,
K˙
K
=
Y
K
(1 + φ− τ)−
C
K
+ ψ
B
K
. (12)
Thus, the economy is completely described by equations (6), (10), (11) and (12) plus the
limiting transversality condition of the household.
Given the definition of an equilibrium for our economy we next define a balanced
growth path (BGP) in defintion 2.
Definition 2 A balanced growth path (BGP) is a path such that the economy is in equi-
librium and such that consumption and capital grow at the same strictly positive constant
growth rate, that is C˙/C = K˙/K = h˙c/hc = g, g > 0, g = constant, and either
(a) B˙ = 0 (balanced budget) or
(b) B˙/B = gB, with 0 < gB < g, gB = constant, (slight deficit) or
(c) B˙/B = C˙/C = K˙/K = h˙c/hc = g (strong deficit).
A BGP is here defined as a path on which all endogenous variables grow at the
same rate, except public debt in case (a) and (b), that is K˙/K = C˙/C = h˙c/hc holds,
and the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is fulfilled. Assuming that
σ > 1 − ρ/(r(1 − τ)) holds, so that the difference between the net interest rate and the
growth rate on the BGP is strictly positive, and positing that the government sets the
primary surplus according to (9) with ψ > 0, any path which satisfies K˙/K = B˙/B =
C˙/C = h˙c/hc is associated with a sustainable public debt.
When the government pursues a balanced budget, case (a), or a slight deficit, case (b),
the intertemporal budget constraint is always fulfilled. In that case public debt remains
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constant or grows less than all other endogenous variables, respectively, so that the present
value of public debt converges to zero asymptotically.
To analyze our economy around a BGP we define the new variables h := hc/K,
b := B/K and c := C/K. Differentiating these variables with respect to time yields a
three dimensional system of differential equations given by,
h˙ = h
(
ξ(1− u)βh
(
uαhα−1(τ − φ)− ψb/h
)1−βh − uαhα(1 + φ− τ) + c− ψb) , (13)
b˙ = b
(
(1− α)(1− τ)uαhα − ψ − φuαhαb−1 − uαhα(1 + φ− τ) + c− ψb
)
, (14)
c˙ = c ((1− τ)(1− α)uαhα/σ − ρ/σ − uαhα(1 + φ− τ) + c− ψb) . (15)
A solution of h˙ = b˙ = c˙ = 0 with respect to h, b, c gives a BGP for our model and the
corresponding ratios h⋆, b⋆, c⋆ on the BGP.3 It should be noted that the case of a balanced
budget, rule (a), and a slight deficit, rule (b), imply that the debt to physical capital ratio
equals zero on the BGP, i.e. b⋆ = 0, so that b˙ = 0 holds, although we have B˙/B 6= K˙/K
for those two policies. In the next section we analyze growth and welfare implications of
the different debt policies given in definition 2.
3 Analysis of the model
We first study growth effects of the different debt policies.
3.1 Growth effects
Before we analyze the growth effects of the different debt policies, we will briefly deal with
the question of existence and stability of a BGP. The balanced budget policy, case (a) in
definition 2, is obtained by setting the reaction coefficient ψ equal to the net return on
capital, (1− τ)r, making ψ an endogenous variable. Further, φ is set equal to zero for all
3The ⋆ denotes BGP values and we exclude the economically meaningless BGP c⋆ = 0 and h⋆ = 0 is
not feasible because h is raised to a negative power in equation (13).
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times, that is φ = 0, for t ∈ [0,∞). A slight deficit, case (b) in definition 2, is obtained
by setting φ = 0 and by letting ψ be a parameter set by the government that can take
any strictly positive value larger than ρ/σ+ r(1− τ)(σ− 1)/σ and smaller than r(1− τ).
Proposition 1 gives results as concerns existence, uniqueness and stability of a balanced
growth path for those two policies.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique saddle point stable balanced growth path when the
government runs a balanced budget. The slight deficit policy gives rise to a unique saddle
point stable balanced growth path, too.
Proof: See appendix A.
This proposition demonstrates that both a balanced government budget and a slight
deficit policy give rise to unique saddle point stable BGPs, where a certain parameter
restriction must be fulfilled in case of a slight deficit. The restriction ρ/σ + r(1− τ)(σ −
1)/σ < ψ < r(1 − τ) states that, on the one hand, ψ must not be too small, ψ >
ρ/σ+r(1−τ)(σ−1)/σ, so that sustained growth is possible. This holds because otherwise
public debt would become too large requiring too many resources for the debt service so
that ongoing growth would not be possible. On the other hand, ψ must not be too
large, ψ < r(1− τ), because otherwise the government would not invest enough in human
capital formation so that sustained growth would not be possible either, which can be
seen from (11). Saddle point stability implies that there exists a unique value for initial
consumption, C(0), such that the economy converges to the BGP for fixed initial values
of the state variables K(0) = K0, H(0) = H0 and B(0) = B0.
As concerns the policy with a strong deficit, case (c) in definition 2, the analytical
model turns out to be quite complicated and no unambiguous results can be derived for
the analytical model. Therefore, in Greiner (2008) numerical examples have been used
to gain insight into the model structure. Among other things, it has been shown that
the budgetary policy must be neither too strict nor too loose such that a BGP can exist.
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If the governemnt pays too much weight on stabilizing public debt, it does not invest
enough in the formation of human capital so that sustained growth is not possible. If,
on the other hand, the government does not care much about controlling public debt,
public debt may become too high so that there are not enough resources left for financing
public educational spending since the debt service requires a great many public resources.
With respect to stability, the reaction of the primary surplus to variations in public debt
is crucial as concerns the question of whether convergence to the BGP can be achieved
in the long-run or not. The reason for that outcome is that a high value of the reaction
coefficient makes the debt to physical capital ratio a mean-reverting process preventing
the debt to capital ratio from exploding. Due to net interest payments on public debt,
r(1− τ)B, the process of debt accumulation is inherently explosive unless the government
puts a sufficiently strong weight on controlling public debt, meaning that it takes counter-
measures by running higher primary surpluses as public debt increases.4
After dealing with the question of existence and stability of a BGP for the different
debt policies, we next analyze long-run growth effects of those policies. First, we state
that a balanced government debt yields the same long-run growth rate as a debt policy
that incurs slight deficits. This is the contents of proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A debt policy such that the government budget is balanced at each point
in time gives the same long-run growth rate as a policy that is characterized by slight
deficits.
Proof: See appendix B.
The economic reason for the outcome stated in proposition 2 is that both those policies
lead to a zero debt to physical capital ratio in the long-run. This implies that in both
cases public resources used for educational spending, relative to physical capital, are the
same giving rise to identical growth rates on the BGP. The only difference between those
4For more details as concerns the strong deficit policy we refer to Greiner (2008).
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two policies is on the transition path. Thus, the balanced budget policy leads to a faster
decline of the debt to physical ratio compared to the slight deficit policy where the debt
ratio declines slowlier. The next proposition establishes a relation between the balanced
growth rate and the debt to physical capital ratio.
Proposition 3 Assume that the net interest rate exceeds the balanced growth rate. Then,
the balanced growth rate is the higher the lower is the debt to physical capital ratio.
Proof: See appendix C.
Proposition 3 shows that the long-run balanced growth rate is the higher, the smaller
is the debt to capital ratio. The economic rationale behind that result is that large
debt ratios lead to a high debt burden. This implies that less resources are available
for educational spending so that the ratio of human capital to physical capital is lower,
compared to a situation with a smaller debt ratio.
It should be pointed out that this outcome is not as obvious as it may seem. This
holds because one could also argue that higher public deficits that lead to higher public
debt are used for educational spending and, thus, for human capital formation that exerts
a growth enhancing effect, so that debt and growth can be positively correlated. However,
that reasoning is not correct as proposition 3 demonstrates.
An immediate implication of proposition 3 is that a balanced budget and a slight
deficit yield a higher balanced growth rate than a budgetary policy such that debt grows
at the same rate as all other endogenous variables, unless the government is a creditor.
If the government is a creditor5 that lends to the private sector the balanced growth
rate exceeds the one obtained with a zero debt to physical capital ratio. That holds
because proposition 3 remains also valid for negative values of b. It should be noted
that the justification for the primary surplus rule specified in equation (9) in case of a
negative government debt is that the government thus prevents the private sector from
5Technically, this implies that public debt and the debt to physical capital ratio are negative.
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running excessive deficits that can endanger the stability of the economy. Stability can be
threatened even if the overall wealth of the private sector W = K +B, i.e. the difference
between physical capital and private debt, remains positive.
Finally, we should like to mention that the assumption of a positive difference between
the net interest rate and the balanced growth rate results from the fact that the intertem-
poral budget constraint of the government would not pose a problem if the reverse held.
In that case, the government could grow out of debt and there would be no need to run
primary surpluses. It should be noted that we refer to the net interest rate because we
use that rate to discount public debt in the intertemporal budget constraint since public
debt grows at the net rate in case of a zero primary surplus, see equation (8).6
In the next subsection we analyze welfare effects associated with the different debt
policies.
3.2 Welfare effects
In order to analyze welfare effects for our model, we resort to simulations. We do so
because the analytical model turns out to become too complex to derive welfare effects
when transition dynamics are taken into account.
We are interested in the question of which of the three debt policies in definition 2
performs best in terms of welfare and whether the reaction coefficient and the initial value
of the debt to physical capital have an effect on the outcome. In addition, we address the
question of whether the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption determines
the welfare effects of the three policies under consideration. We should also like to point
out that we only consider the situation where the government is a debtor, i.e. the case
b ≥ 0, since this is the empirically more relevant case.
6This implies that the primary surplus is defined exclusive of the tax revenue from interest income.
But, using the gross interest rate to discount public debt and including the tax revenue from the interest
income in the primary surplus does not change the outcome.
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To compute welfare, we solve the dynamics system (13)-(15) for given initial conditions
h0, b0 and c(0) chosen on the stable manifold, by linearizing the system around the BGP.
Given the time path of h(t) we then obtain the growth rate of consumption from equation
(6) that is used to compute the time path of the level of consumption, C(t). Given C(t)
we can compute welfare as the integral,
J := max
C
∫
∞
0
e−ρt (C1−σ − 1)/(1− σ)dt, (16)
where we set the initial condition with respect to the physical capital stock equal to one,
K0 = 1, so that C(0) = c(0) holds.
As a benchmark for our computations we set the income tax rate to twenty percent,
τ = 0.2, and the elasticity of production with respect to physical capital is set to 30
percent, 1 − α = 0.3. The rate of time preference is set to 5 percent, ρ = 0.05, and 90
percent of the available time is assumed to be used in the final goods sector, u = 0.9,
and 10 percent for human capital formation. As concerns the elasticity of human capital
formation with respect to time we set βh = 0.75 and ξ = 0.15. The initial condition
of h is set to h0 = 0.2 and remains unchanged throughout the simulations. Finally, we
set φ = −0.01 for the strong deficit policy, implying that a marginal increase in GDP
reduces the primary surplus by 1 percent implying that public educational spending rises
by that amount. As concerns the intertemporal elasticity of substitution we consider a
logarithmic utility function, σ = 1, and the case with σ = 2.
In table 1 we report the outcome of our simulations for the balanced budget policy
and for the slight deficit policy for different initial conditions with respect to the debt to
capital ratio assuming a logarithmic utility function, σ = 1.7
Table 1 shows that a slight deficit yields higher welfare than the balanced budget
policy for the initial debt to capital ratios considered in that table. However, the smaller
7A debt to capital ratio of 10%, 30%, 50% and 70% implies an initial debt to GDP ratio of 33.2%,
99.6%, 166% and 232% for h0 = 0.2, respectively.
13
Welfare J
deficit policy b0 = 0.1 b0 = 0.3 b0 = 0.5 b0 = 0.7
balanced budget -21.923 -21.3099 -20.7476 -20.2319
slight deficit -21.9218 -21.296 -20.7086 -20.1567
Table 1: Welfare for a balanced government budget and for a slight deficit (σ = 1).
the initial debt to GDP ratio is, the smaller is the difference between those two policies
and for very small debt ratios the balanced budget policy may even perform better. In
our example, that holds for initial debt to capital ratios smaller than about 0.05.
The economic reason for that outcome is that the slight deficit policy gives a higher
growth rate of consumption on the transition path because more public resources are
available for human capital formation that stimulates growth, since the government puts
less weight on reducing the debt to capital ratio fast. For very small initial debt ratios,
however, this effect is not so important because the debt burden is small in this case,
so that there are sufficient public resources available that are used for human capital
formation. Therefore, a slight deficit policy may perform worse because it reduces public
debt too slowly so that the negative effect of public debt on the growth of consumption
dominates the one of a less strict public debt policy that tends to raise public educational
spending.
In table 2 we report welfare J for the strong deficit policy with different values of the
reaction coefficient ψ and for different initial conditions with respect to the debt to capital
ratio, assuming a logarithmic utility function, σ = 1.
Table 2 shows that welfare is the higher, the higher is the initial debt to capital ratio,
for a given value of the reaction coefficient ψ. The reason for that result is that a higher
initial debt ratio implies a higher initial level of consumption which gives higher welfare,
even if the growth rate of consumption is smaller in that case. Further, for a given initial
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Welfare J
deficit policy b0 = 0.1 b0 = 0.3 b0 = 0.5 b0 = 0.7
strong deficit, ψ = 0.3 -21.9317 -21.4237 -21.0728 -20.8658
strong deficit, ψ = 0.2 -21.928 -21.3878 -20.9733 -20.673
strong deficit, ψ = 0.1 -21.9223 -21.3334 -20.818 -20.3696
strong deficit, ψ = 0.075 -21.9176 -21.3212 -20.78 -20.2893
strong deficit, ψ = 0.065 -21.9059 -21.3189 -20.7788 -20.2819
strong deficit, ψ = 0.055 -21.6114 -21.1644 -20.7549 -20.3803
strong deficit, ψ ≤ 0.052 no BGP
Table 2: Welfare for the case of a strong public deficit (σ = 1).
debt ratio, welfare rises with a decline in the reaction coefficient ψ.8 This holds because
lower values of ψ imply that the government puts less weight on stabilizing debt but more
on financing public educational spending that have a growth enhancing effect. When
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is high, the household is very
willing to shift resources from consumption to investment, generating considerably higher
consumption growth. The higher growth rate of consumption, finally, leads to higher
welfare. That holds unless the initial debt ratio is very large, b0 = 0.7 in our example,
where welfare first rises but, then, declines again. In that case, the public debt is so
high that the negative growth effect of public debt dominates the positive effect of more
educational spending, once a certain threshold of ψ is reached giving an inverted U-shaped
relation between welfare and the reaction coefficient ψ.
Comparing tables 1 and 2, one realizes that both the slight deficit policy and the
balanced budget perform better than the strong deficit for relatively high values of initial
public debt, i.e. for b0 = 0.5 and b0 = 0.7 in our example. This holds because with high
8Note that a decline in ψ represents a deficit financed increase in educational spending.
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Welfare J
deficit policy b0 = 0.1 b0 = 0.3 b0 = 0.5 b0 = 0.7
balanced budget -42.2578 -39.576 -37.2063 -35.1045
slight deficit -42.2669 -39.5715 -37.1531 -34.9741
Table 3: Welfare for a balanced government budget and for a slight deficit (σ = 2).
initial debt to capital ratios, it is more important to reduce the public debt rather than
to raise educational spending. Only if the initial debt to capital ratios are relatively low,
i.e. for b0 = 0.1 and b0 = 0.3 in our example, a strong deficit policy can perform better
in terms of welfare when the government sets the reaction coefficient ψ to a low value,
meaning that it puts more emphasis on financing public educational spending rather than
controlling public debt. It can do so because with a low initial debt to capital ratio, the
negative effects of public debt are not too drastic so that public debt does not pose too
great a problem. More deficit financed educational spending raises consumption growth
and, thus, welfare. A positive welfare effect of that policy is the more likely, the higher is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption since a high elasticity implies
that the consumption growth rate reacts strongly to variations in the marginal product
of capital.
In the next two tables, we perform the analysis assuming that the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption is lower and we set σ = 2.
Table 3 demonstrates that a slight deficit yields higher welfare than the balanced
budget, unless the initial debt to capital ratio is small, i.e. smaller than b0 = 0.1 in our
example. The reason for that result is the same as for the outcome in table 1: With a
low initial debt ratio the government has scope for financing public educational spending
that raises the growth of private consumption so that there is no need to finance public
education through deficits. In such a situation it is better to reduce the debt to GDP
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Welfare J
deficit policy b0 = 0.1 b0 = 0.3 b0 = 0.5 b0 = 0.7
strong deficit, ψ = 0.3 -42.2661 -39.7337 -37.7689 -36.3018
strong deficit, ψ = 0.2 -42.3041 -39.7189 -37.6171 -35.9314
strong deficit, ψ = 0.1 -42.5189 -39.9029 -37.6138 -35.6182
strong deficit, ψ = 0.075 -42.6895 -40.5263 -38.4884 -36.668
strong deficit, ψ = 0.073 -42.8113 -40.5617 -38.6648 -36.9727
strong deficit, ψ ≤ 0.058 no BGP
Table 4: Welfare for the case of a strong public deficit (σ = 2).
ratio faster rather than to run deficits to finance public spending.
Table 4 presents the results for the strong deficit policy. First of all, it can be realized
that welfare is the higher, the higher is the initial debt to capital ratio, for a given value
of the reaction coefficient ψ, as in table 2. Again, this is due to higher initial consumption
that goes along with higher initial public debt.
For a given initial debt to capital ratio welfare first rises as the reaction coefficient ψ
declines because this implies that educational spending increases which raises the growth
rate of consumption and, thus, welfare. However, once a certain threshold is reached the
relation becomes negative and welfare declines again. This holds because the lower value
of ψ leads to higher public debt that exerts a negative effect on growth and welfare. This
U-shaped relation between welfare and the reaction coefficient holds for all initial debt to
GDP ratios except for b0 = 0.1. If the initial debt ratio is small and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is low, the negative effect of higher public debt, as a result of
a lower ψ, dominates the consumption growth stimulating effect of higher educational
spending such that welfare monotonically declines with a lower ψ. It should be noted
that this is in contrast to the first column of table 2, where welfare rises as ψ is reduced,
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demonstrating that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is crucial
as concerns welfare effects of deficit financed educational spending, modelled by a decline
in ψ.
Further, comparing tables 3 and 4 shows that the balanced budget policy and the
slight deficit policy always generate higher welfare than a public debt policy that incurs
large deficits, independent of the initial conditions with respect to public debt relative to
capital. When the intertemporal elasticity is low, σ = 2, the household sector is not very
willing to shift resources between consumption and investment. Therefore, more deficit
financed educational spending do not generate a large increase in consumption growth so
that the strong deficit policy does not perform better in the case with σ = 2, compared
to the balanced budget and slight deficit policy.
Finally, we should like to point out that for values of ψ lower than about 0.73, the
Jacobian matrix of the system (13)-(15) is characterized by complex conjugate eigenvalues,
showing that the system undergoes a qualitative change. Complex conjugate eigenvalues
mean that there are transitory oscillations until the economy reaches the BGP and for
ψ ≤ 0.058, finally, the BGP ceases to exist.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied growth and welfare effects of three different debt policies
in an endogenous growth model with public educational spending: a balanced budget
policy, a slight deficit policy where debt grows but less than all other variables, and a
strong debt policy where debt grows at the same rate as all other endogenous variables
in the long-run. While long-run growth effects of the different debt policies can be easily
derived, welfare effects are more complex because welfare depends on several factors and
transition dynamics have to be considered.
As concerns growth, we have seen that the balanced budget policy and the slight
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deficit policy are equivalent as regards the balanced growth rate and always give a higher
long-run growth rate than the strong deficit policy, unless the government is a creditor
that lends to the private sector. In that case, public debt becomes negative and the
growth rate is higher than for the balanced budget and for the slight deficit policy.
Using numerical examples, we could show that the balanced budget and the slight
deficit policy yield higher welfare than large public deficits, unless the initial debt to capital
ratio is small and unless the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is
high. In that case, controlling public debt is less important because the negative feedback
effects of debt on consumption growth are negligible. In such a situation, stimulating
consumption growth by financing public educational spending that raises human capital
is more important and leads to welfare gains.
Comparing the balanced budget policy and the slight deficit policy, one realizes that
the slight deficit policy performs better than the balanced budget policy, unless the initial
debt ratio is small. In the latter case, a balanced budget policy is preferable because
the feedback effects of low debt ratios are small so that the government has sufficient
resources available for educational spending. Therefore, there is no need to run deficits to
finance educational spending to spur human capital accumulation and, as a consquence,
consumption growth.
Further, we could show that there may exist an inverted U-shaped relation between
welfare and deficit financed educational spending meaning that welfare first rises as
deficit financed educational spending increases but declines again as a certain threshold
is reached. This non-monotonic relation is the more likely, the lower is the intertemporal
elasticity of consumption and the higher is the initial debt ratio.
Finally, we have seen that welfare is the higher, the higher is the initial debt ratio for
a given deficit policy. This is due to higher initial private consumption that goes along
with a higher debt ratio, even if a higher initial debt gives a lower consumption growth
rate. This result holds for all three debt policies we analyzed and is also independent of
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the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption.
A Proof of proposition 1
To prove this proposition for the balanced budget policy, we set φ = 0, ψ = (1 − τ)(1 −
α)uαhα and b⋆ = 0. Setting h˙/h = 0 and solving this equation with respect to c gives c
as a function of h and of parameters. Substituting this function for c in c˙ gives
q(x, ·) := (1− α)uαhα(1− τ)/σ − ρ/σ −
(
uαhα−1τ
)1−βh ξ(1− u)βh .
It is easily seen that limh→0 q(h, ·) = −∞, limh→∞ q(h, ·) = +∞ and ∂q(·)/∂h > 0. Thus,
existence of a unique BGP is shown.
To show saddle point stability, we compute the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest
point of (13)-(15). The Jacobian is given by
J =


∂h˙/∂h ∂h˙/∂b ∂h˙/∂c
0 ∂b˙/∂b 0
∂c˙/∂h ∂c˙/∂b ∂c˙/∂c

 .
One eigenvalue of this matrix is given by µ1 = ∂b˙/∂b = −K˙/K = −g. Thus, we know that
one eigenvalue is negative. Further, it is easily seen that (∂h˙/∂h)(∂c˙/∂c)−(∂h˙/∂c)(∂c˙/∂h)
is given by (∂h˙/∂h)(∂c˙/∂c)−(∂h˙/∂c)(∂c˙/∂h) = hc[(1−βh)(Ie/hc)
−βh(α−1)hα−2uατξ(1−
u)βh−αhα−1uα(1− τ)(1−α)/σ] < 0, so that complex conjugate eigenvalues are excluded.
The determinant of J is given by det J = (∂b˙/∂b)[(∂h˙/∂h)(∂c˙/∂c)− (∂h˙/∂c)(∂c˙/∂h)] > 0.
Since the product of the eigenvalues equals the determinant, µ1 · µ2 · µ3 = det J > 0, and
because of µ1 < 0, we know that two eigenvalues are negative and one is positive.
In the case of a slight deficit, we have φ = 0 and b⋆ = 0. Then, we proceed analogously
so that existence and uniqueness is readily shown. For B˙/B < C˙/C to hold we must have
ρ/σ+ r(1− τ)(σ− 1)/σ < ψ and ψ < (1− τ)r must hold for B˙/B > 0. Because of b⋆ = 0
the Jacobian matrix is the same as for policy (a) except for ∂b˙/∂b that now is given by
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∂b˙/∂b = µ1 = B˙/B − K˙/K < 0, because of B˙/B < K˙/K at the BGP. In particular,
the determinant is again positive implying that two eigenvalues are negative and one is
positive. 2
B Proof of proposition 2
To prove proposition 2 we note that policy (a) implies b(t) = b0e
−(gK)t, with gK denoting
the growth rate of physical capital. Policy (b) implies b(t) = b0e
(gB−gK)t, with gB the
growth rate of public debt. Asymptotically, we get limt→∞ gK = g and 0 < gB < g. This
shows that b⋆ = 0 holds both for policy (a) and for policy (b). Further, for both policies
we have φ = 0. A BGP implies C˙/C = K˙/K = h˙c/hc which gives, using φ = 0 and
b⋆ = 0,
(−ρ+ (1− τ)(1− α)uαhα)/σ = uαhα(1− τ)− c = ξ (1− u)βh
(
τ uα hα−1
)1−βh .
Since that condition is the same for the balanced budget and for the slight deficit, those
two policies yield identical values for h⋆ and c⋆ and for the balanced growth rate, too.
This proves proposition 2 2
C Proof of proposition proposition 3
To prove proposition 3 we note that we have φ = 0 and b⋆ = 0 both in policy (a) and in
policy (b). A BGP implies C˙/C = h˙c/hc. Using φ = 0 and b
⋆ = 0, this gives,
(−ρ+ (1− τ)(1− α)uαhα)/σ = ξ (1− u)βh
(
τ uα hα−1
)1−βh (A4.1)
The left hand side in (A4.1) is monotonically increasing in h and the right hand side
is monotonically declining in h. A value h such that the left hand side in (A4.1) equals
the right hand side gives a BGP for policy (a) and for policy (b).
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For policy (c), C˙/C = h˙c/hc implies
(−ρ+ (1− τ)(1− α)uαhα)/σ = ξ (1− u)βh
(
τ uα hα−1 − φuα hα−1 − ψ b/h
)1−βh (A4.2)
From C˙/C = B˙/B that must hold for policy (c) on a BGP, we get the following relation
between b and h on the BGP,
b =
φuα hα
(1− τ)r − g − ψ
(A4.3)
Using (A4.3) to substitute b in (A4.2) leads to
(−ρ+(1−τ)(1−α)uαhα)/σ = ξ(1−u)βh
(
τuαhα−1 −
φuαhα−1((1− τ)r − g)
(1− τ)r − g − ψ
)1−βh
(A4.4)
A value h such that the left hand side in (A4.4) equals the right hand side gives a BGP
for policy (c).
The function on the left hand side of equation (A4.1) and of equation (A4.4) are
identical. From (A4.3) we see that a positive (negative) value of b implies that φ and
(1 − τ)r − g) − ψ have the same (opposite) sign. Thus, for (1 − τ)r > g the graph of
the function on the right hand side of (A4.1) is above (below) the graph of the function
on the right hand side of (A4.4) for all h ∈ [0,∞) for b > (<) 0. Therefore, the left hand
side and the right hand side in (A4.1) intersect at a larger (smaller) value of h than the
left hand side and the right hand side in (A4.4) for b > (<) 0, giving a smaller balanced
growth rate for policy (c) than for policies (a) and (b). 2
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